There are many reasons to criticize Aoun's inflexibility on the issue of the cabinet formation, some more meaningful than others. Some say he's putting his ego and his personal or family interests ahead of the interest of his community and his country. Some are a bit more forgiving and say it's his political party not his personal interests that is being treated to a free ride at the expense of the nation. It's not easy, if one wishes it, to argue against these claims (or for them for that matter) as they are derived from complex political analysis and reasoning and more often than not fueled by subjective and nonrational opinions. The validity of these claims thus ends up in the intractable realm of the unprovable and the unfalsifiable.
There are, however, those who criticize Aoun's stubbornness by claiming he doesn't have the right to make the demands he's making, that since he lost the elections, the constitution requires him to just sit back and let the winners make the government as they please, and that with Hariri having already made enough compromise by giving in to the 15-10-5 formula (15 pro-majority ministers, 10 pro-opposition, and 5 neutral selected by the president), the opposition no longer has the right to pin up these demands. They even go to the extent of believing, with some degree of delusion might I add, that the only reason Hariri is even humoring Aoun's demands, rather than just making up his own government, is out of fear of military repercussions from Hezbollah's mighty militia, akin to what happened in May of 2008. This argument, being based on the legality of the demands rather than their morality, is quite easy to validate. In fact, the facts on the ground point undeniably to one conclusion: ugly though these demands may be to some, they are perfectly legal and have absolutely no need for either extortion with military threats or enforcement by foreign backing.
I do like to say here, that I'm not a big fan of the way the issue is being handled by the opposition, and I certainly am not saying Aoun should be doing things the way he is. I'm simply here to make the case that he has the right to, whether we like it or not.
Simply put, Hariri does not have the constitutional authority to ignore Aoun's demands, and this is precisely why he chose to resign rather than ignore them. Ignoring them was simply not a legal option, and it still isn't. It's true that Hariri's camp won the elections, but we all know what happened after that. Jumblatt, along with his ten MPs broke off from the March 14 group, and although they didn't join the ranks of the opposition, they certainly can no longer be counted among Hariri's coalition. This means that Hariri now controls 60 of the 128 seats in parliament, which leaves 68 MPs outside of his control. For any government proposed by Hariri to get parliamentary confidence, some of these non-Hariri MPs have to vote for it. Now given that Jumblatt is adamant about the 15-10-5 formula, and obviously the 57 opposition MPs won't have anything to do with a government that doesn't adhere to it, how exactly can one perceive Hariri's adoption of this formula as some sort of compromise on his part? And we haven't even mentioned the role of the President, whose signature on the cabinet formation is needed to make it valid, and who on more than one occasion said he won't agree to a cabinet that does not get approval of the opposition.
So in short, Hariri's agreement to form a national unity government does not stem solely from his desire to be collegial and conciliatory. It also stems from the fact that he simply doesn't have enough friends in parliament or in the presidential palace to legally do anything else. This makes the 15-10-5 requirement a matter of fact rather than compromise. And although Hariri "won" the elections, Aoun's demands now have the implicit backing of the president as well as the majority of parliament, which makes them as legal as they can possibly get short of being a matter of national consensus.
So unless Hariri is willing to step aside and let someone else take over, he has to figure out a way to strike a deal with Aoun and his allies about their demands. And in that case, he should accept that the 15-10-5 formula is the starting point of negotiations and not the middle ground he has been claiming it is. Aoun's demands need to be dealt with seriously and not be dismissed as the ravings of an egotistical mad man... But, yeah, that doesn't mean he's not an asshole.
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Thursday, September 10, 2009
Why We Don’t Have a Government Yet
It’s been way longer than most people anticipated. Our PM-designate Saadeddine Hariri has, after a couple of months of silent negotiations, just submitted a virtually 'unapprovable' cabinet formation to President Suleiman ('unapprovable' not necessarily because there's something wrong with it, but because it simply won't get approved). The main point of contention is Michel Aoun’s demands (do you begin to see a pattern here) for some key cabinet portfolios as well as some specific names attached to these portfolios. It makes one wonder why, for such a staunch supporter of Consensual Democracy, he's making it so hard to reach consensus.
On the face of it, the whole discussion seems kinda reasonable with both sides having arguably decent positions. Aoun says he wants Jubran Basseel to keep his post of Minister of Telecommunications because he's been doing such a good job. Members of the Hariri camp say they don’t want Jubran Basseel because he failed to keep his parliament seat in the latest round of elections and thus does not have a popular mandate.
Both arguments may have merit. But I don’t see it. The fact that Jubran Basseel “did a good job” does not make him the ONLY person capable of maintaining the ministry, and it certainly doesn't make him the best person for the job. So blocking the formation of the entire cabinet for over 2 months just because he “did a good job” does not make any sense. Give the PM-designate some respect as he exercises his constitutional right to work out the details of the formation. He’s already gone far enough to meet the opposition half way by agreeing to create a cabinet where he doesn’t even have a majority.
However, it’s still a better argument than what the Hariri camp has presented against Basseel. Just as it’s typical of Aoun to block everything, it seems also typical of the Hariri camp to fight back with arbitrary short-lived one-shot principles. “No ‘ministerizing’ losers.” Really? Remember Nassib Lahhoud? Well, two years ago that same camp was proposing that “loser” as one of their two candidates for the Presidency. Sure they never got close to electing him, but they certainly weren’t against it ‘on principle.’ So if no popular mandate is needed to become President, surely no popular mandate is required for a mere Minister of Telecommunications. The whole principle of “not minesterizing losers” loses even more credibility when a good number of Hariri’s proposed cabinet didn’t even run for elections. How did these people earn cabinet positions (including the Finance portfolio) any more than Basseel?
For me it’s obvious that Aoun’s “arguments” and Hariri’s “principles” are there just to hide the real issue. No, I'm not talking about Aoun wanting to satisfy some megalomaniacal desire to see his own will forced upon the PM-designate while the latter having an unfulfilled need to crush Aoun's ego by making him capitulate on his demands. Though, even THAT makes more sense than the actual arguments being presented by both sides.
To understand the real issue, we must ask the question: Why is this particular portfolio so contentious? Why is it so important for Aoun to keep it and for Hariri to take it back?
Well I’m becoming among those who think that, once again, the answer lies in issue of Hezbollah’s weapons (although I’m often reluctant to acknowledge the prevalence of these weapons in many contentious issues of Lebanese politics). Of course we’re not talking about guns and rockets, but about what Nasrallah referred to as Signal Weaponry. Remember the tragic events of May of 2008. These occured when the Lebanese government issued two decisions that caused all hell to break lose including what is now referred to as Hezbollah’s invasion of Beirut. Well the more significant of these two decisions was initiated by then-Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, when he recommended that the government put an end to Hezbollah’s illegal network of wired telecommunication. Hezbollah, which considers this network to be an integral part of its weaponry, saw that as a direct attack on its military infrastructure, and thus carried out Nasrallah’s threat to “cut the hand” that tries to reach for his party’s weapons.
So while to most Lebanese, the Ministry of Telecommunication is basically the place where Internet and mobile phone rates are controlled, it is also the watchtower from which one can keep an eye on Hezbollah’s telecommunications network, and from which, maybe, one day, when Hizbollah is unable to respond as swiftly as in May of 2008, declare this infrastructure illegal once again. Surely Hezbollah doesn't want to see this ministry in the hands of his political rivals for the next four-years while Hariri and his allies certainly don't want to give this powerful card away.
On the face of it, the whole discussion seems kinda reasonable with both sides having arguably decent positions. Aoun says he wants Jubran Basseel to keep his post of Minister of Telecommunications because he's been doing such a good job. Members of the Hariri camp say they don’t want Jubran Basseel because he failed to keep his parliament seat in the latest round of elections and thus does not have a popular mandate.
Both arguments may have merit. But I don’t see it. The fact that Jubran Basseel “did a good job” does not make him the ONLY person capable of maintaining the ministry, and it certainly doesn't make him the best person for the job. So blocking the formation of the entire cabinet for over 2 months just because he “did a good job” does not make any sense. Give the PM-designate some respect as he exercises his constitutional right to work out the details of the formation. He’s already gone far enough to meet the opposition half way by agreeing to create a cabinet where he doesn’t even have a majority.
However, it’s still a better argument than what the Hariri camp has presented against Basseel. Just as it’s typical of Aoun to block everything, it seems also typical of the Hariri camp to fight back with arbitrary short-lived one-shot principles. “No ‘ministerizing’ losers.” Really? Remember Nassib Lahhoud? Well, two years ago that same camp was proposing that “loser” as one of their two candidates for the Presidency. Sure they never got close to electing him, but they certainly weren’t against it ‘on principle.’ So if no popular mandate is needed to become President, surely no popular mandate is required for a mere Minister of Telecommunications. The whole principle of “not minesterizing losers” loses even more credibility when a good number of Hariri’s proposed cabinet didn’t even run for elections. How did these people earn cabinet positions (including the Finance portfolio) any more than Basseel?
For me it’s obvious that Aoun’s “arguments” and Hariri’s “principles” are there just to hide the real issue. No, I'm not talking about Aoun wanting to satisfy some megalomaniacal desire to see his own will forced upon the PM-designate while the latter having an unfulfilled need to crush Aoun's ego by making him capitulate on his demands. Though, even THAT makes more sense than the actual arguments being presented by both sides.
To understand the real issue, we must ask the question: Why is this particular portfolio so contentious? Why is it so important for Aoun to keep it and for Hariri to take it back?
Well I’m becoming among those who think that, once again, the answer lies in issue of Hezbollah’s weapons (although I’m often reluctant to acknowledge the prevalence of these weapons in many contentious issues of Lebanese politics). Of course we’re not talking about guns and rockets, but about what Nasrallah referred to as Signal Weaponry. Remember the tragic events of May of 2008. These occured when the Lebanese government issued two decisions that caused all hell to break lose including what is now referred to as Hezbollah’s invasion of Beirut. Well the more significant of these two decisions was initiated by then-Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, when he recommended that the government put an end to Hezbollah’s illegal network of wired telecommunication. Hezbollah, which considers this network to be an integral part of its weaponry, saw that as a direct attack on its military infrastructure, and thus carried out Nasrallah’s threat to “cut the hand” that tries to reach for his party’s weapons.
So while to most Lebanese, the Ministry of Telecommunication is basically the place where Internet and mobile phone rates are controlled, it is also the watchtower from which one can keep an eye on Hezbollah’s telecommunications network, and from which, maybe, one day, when Hizbollah is unable to respond as swiftly as in May of 2008, declare this infrastructure illegal once again. Surely Hezbollah doesn't want to see this ministry in the hands of his political rivals for the next four-years while Hariri and his allies certainly don't want to give this powerful card away.
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