While the Lebanese are planning their next elections, due to take place in less than two weeks, the rest of the world seems to be doing their best to make sure the elections go according to their interests. With the elections so close, this might not be such a difficult task. Most observers seem to be predicting an advantage for the Hezbollah - FPM alliance at the expense of the March 14 alliance (and by "most observers" I mean CNN and BBC). So it's not surprising to see US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton making a surprise visit to Beirut to declare the US's commitment to a democratic and free Lebanon and to insist on the importance of preventing foreign interference in the Lebanese elections followed ironically by Joe Biden's vist to Beirut (the first ever by a sitting US Vice-President) in which he said, “We will evaluate the shape of our assistance programs based on the shape of the new government." At the same time Israeli officials keep reminding the Lebanese that Lebanon will pay severely for voting in a Hezbollah-led government, with Ehud Barak recently saying, "If Hizbullah wins the elections with a large margin, Lebanon will expose itself to the might of the Israeli army more than any time in the past." I don't know about you but I think there's little else that foreign nations can do to influence elections than using threats of military force along with promise of economic aid.
And in the face of the American-Israeli "carrot and stick," the Iranians and Syrians need to do very little in order to influence the result of the elections in their favour. In fact, they actually need to do as little as possible (publicly of course). By keeping a low profile, they give their Hezbollah allies the ability to show the (admittedly naive) Lebanese that their side is getting little foreign support in the face of the blatant intervention by Israel and the US in favor of the March 14 alliance. So they probably stick to the common practice of (secretly) funneling cash into the campaigns of their allies all the while pointing out the importance of Lebanese elections free from outside influence.
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
An Uncommon Retraction
It is not very common for Hassan Nasrallah to retract something he said. He's a bit like the pope in that matter, infallible and generally unapologetic. So I was pleasantly surprised yesterday when, during a speech marking the 9th anniversary of the liberation of the once Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon, Nasrallah reiterated what he sees as the positive outcomes of May 7, but added, "that is why I called it a glorious day, while I accept that it was a painful day and a sad day."
So it's not a complete retraction, nor is it an apology, but it is far more conciliatory than what he had said a few days ago, and it's as much of a retraction as we can expect from Nasrallah at a time like this.
This leads me to two questions. The first is: What was he thinking when he said it the first time and why did he not foresee the obvious negative reactions (even from those who normally support him) to his speech ten days ago?
The second question is: Is Nasrallah reading my blog?
UPDATE: Just to clarify things, after a brief discussion with Ameen: when I said "negative reactions" I was not qualifying the reactions as being negative or unjustified in and of themselves, but rather that they were (understandably) negative towards Nasrallah's original statements, which themselves, as I said in my previous post, were pretty unjustified in my opinion. Hope that clears things up, and thanks to Ameen for pointing out my subtle yet significant linguistic error.
So it's not a complete retraction, nor is it an apology, but it is far more conciliatory than what he had said a few days ago, and it's as much of a retraction as we can expect from Nasrallah at a time like this.
This leads me to two questions. The first is: What was he thinking when he said it the first time and why did he not foresee the obvious negative reactions (even from those who normally support him) to his speech ten days ago?
The second question is: Is Nasrallah reading my blog?
UPDATE: Just to clarify things, after a brief discussion with Ameen: when I said "negative reactions" I was not qualifying the reactions as being negative or unjustified in and of themselves, but rather that they were (understandably) negative towards Nasrallah's original statements, which themselves, as I said in my previous post, were pretty unjustified in my opinion. Hope that clears things up, and thanks to Ameen for pointing out my subtle yet significant linguistic error.
Saturday, May 16, 2009
The March 14 Prophecy
There's a funny story we used to tell about March 14 supporters who, in the days leading to March 14, seemed to have forgotten that they weren't alone in the country. So much so, that on March 8, one soon-to-be March 14er told a reporter, "I don't know why they did that, we were all united before they showed up."
This "March 14 equals Lebanon" formula was not just a passing theme. It had become a fundamental part of internal and regional Lebanese politics over the next four years, referring to the year-long opposition sit-in in downtown Beirut as an "occupation," continually using the mantra "state within a state," and culminating in July 2006 when Fouad Sanioura accepted then US Secretary of State Condalezza Rice's full support for Lebanon at the same time that her administration and congress was handing Israel extra fuel and munitions to bomb the non-March-14-friendly South of Lebanon. Today, this 'foreignization' of the opposition can be seen in March 14's electoral campaign: "Vote for Lebanon." It's leaders' political speech includes such brilliant statements as "If March 8 wins, then Lebanon will be ruled from Damascus's countryside."
This mentality, which had become so prevalent in March 14 speech that I have come to believe it runs far deeper than mere tactical political smearing, is my primary issue with March 14. The fundamentally hypocritical monopolization of Lebanese identity by a group of parties that represent half of Lebanon and whose founding principles were those of unity and coexistence stood in stark contrast with everything I believe in as a Lebanese. This pushed me so far away from this political group that I felt a sense of belonging among the citizens of "Non-Lebanese" Lebanon.
Enter Hassan Nasrallah.
Since May 7, 2008, I had been rationalizing how the events of that day were a tragic yet inevitable result of an extreme political climate coupled with an irresponsible government decision. I had convinced myself that Hezbollah was cornered and had little other choice. Of course though some details of the events are unforgivable (such as the burning down of Future TV headquarters), the event itself seemed like a heavy price paid by Lebanon for an overdue wake-up call. I believed, and still do, that Lebanon needed to simply pick up the pieces and move forward.
And that it did. The coming months saw the best political climate Lebanon has seen since before February 14th 2005. The Doha accords, the election of a president, the new government and the new electoral law all gave me a little hope. Yet I never went as far as saying that all this was a direct result of May 7, not because I didn't believe so, but probably because I refused to attribute these positive developments to such a negative event.
Yesterday, during a graduation ceremony in Beirut's southern suburb, Nasrallah said, "I tell the Lebanese, in particular Sunnis and Shiites, that the May 7 events put an end to war in Beirut. The May 7 events safeguarded Lebanon's institutions and forced all Lebanese parties to go back to the dialogue, which led to the election of President Michel Sleiman."
So, unlike me, Nasrallah does not seem to have that problem in admitting that these events are directly responsible for the seemingly positive events that followed. And though I had often hoped Nasrallah would apologize to those he had wronged on that day in order to heal the wound upon which recent stability was built, I half-heartedly understood his inability to do so (I say inability because I also managed to convince myself that he actually wanted to apologize but couldn't). So imagine how I felt when he went and declared yesterday, "that May 7 was a glorious day in the history of the resistance."
A glorious day? Really??
May 25 is a glorious day for Lebanon. I also accepted, despite the death and destruction, that August 14 was as a glorious day... May 7, 2008 was certainly NOT a glorious day for Lebanon and if Mr. Nasrallah thinks that doesn't disqualify it from being a glorious day for the resistance... It makes me wonder...
Has The Resistance become so removed from Lebanon that its glorious days now include a day that saw death, destruction and widespread fear in Lebanon's capital, inflicted directly by the Resistance itself? How can The Resistance, whose promise of never using its arms against its own citizens still forms the basis for its legitimacy, remember as "glorious" a day in which it did just that? Or were the sunni citizens of Beirut and supporter's of Mustaqbal, no longer citizens of Lebanon, the country Hezbollah vowed to protect?
Maybe Nasrallah just joined the ranks of dividers and foreignizers, those who see the "other Lebanon" as another country altogether. Or maybe it was always the case but I was was unable to see it, and it that case, wouldn't that mean that maybe, just maybe, March 14 had actually gotten something right after all?...
This "March 14 equals Lebanon" formula was not just a passing theme. It had become a fundamental part of internal and regional Lebanese politics over the next four years, referring to the year-long opposition sit-in in downtown Beirut as an "occupation," continually using the mantra "state within a state," and culminating in July 2006 when Fouad Sanioura accepted then US Secretary of State Condalezza Rice's full support for Lebanon at the same time that her administration and congress was handing Israel extra fuel and munitions to bomb the non-March-14-friendly South of Lebanon. Today, this 'foreignization' of the opposition can be seen in March 14's electoral campaign: "Vote for Lebanon." It's leaders' political speech includes such brilliant statements as "If March 8 wins, then Lebanon will be ruled from Damascus's countryside."
This mentality, which had become so prevalent in March 14 speech that I have come to believe it runs far deeper than mere tactical political smearing, is my primary issue with March 14. The fundamentally hypocritical monopolization of Lebanese identity by a group of parties that represent half of Lebanon and whose founding principles were those of unity and coexistence stood in stark contrast with everything I believe in as a Lebanese. This pushed me so far away from this political group that I felt a sense of belonging among the citizens of "Non-Lebanese" Lebanon.
Enter Hassan Nasrallah.
Since May 7, 2008, I had been rationalizing how the events of that day were a tragic yet inevitable result of an extreme political climate coupled with an irresponsible government decision. I had convinced myself that Hezbollah was cornered and had little other choice. Of course though some details of the events are unforgivable (such as the burning down of Future TV headquarters), the event itself seemed like a heavy price paid by Lebanon for an overdue wake-up call. I believed, and still do, that Lebanon needed to simply pick up the pieces and move forward.
And that it did. The coming months saw the best political climate Lebanon has seen since before February 14th 2005. The Doha accords, the election of a president, the new government and the new electoral law all gave me a little hope. Yet I never went as far as saying that all this was a direct result of May 7, not because I didn't believe so, but probably because I refused to attribute these positive developments to such a negative event.
Yesterday, during a graduation ceremony in Beirut's southern suburb, Nasrallah said, "I tell the Lebanese, in particular Sunnis and Shiites, that the May 7 events put an end to war in Beirut. The May 7 events safeguarded Lebanon's institutions and forced all Lebanese parties to go back to the dialogue, which led to the election of President Michel Sleiman."
So, unlike me, Nasrallah does not seem to have that problem in admitting that these events are directly responsible for the seemingly positive events that followed. And though I had often hoped Nasrallah would apologize to those he had wronged on that day in order to heal the wound upon which recent stability was built, I half-heartedly understood his inability to do so (I say inability because I also managed to convince myself that he actually wanted to apologize but couldn't). So imagine how I felt when he went and declared yesterday, "that May 7 was a glorious day in the history of the resistance."
A glorious day? Really??
May 25 is a glorious day for Lebanon. I also accepted, despite the death and destruction, that August 14 was as a glorious day... May 7, 2008 was certainly NOT a glorious day for Lebanon and if Mr. Nasrallah thinks that doesn't disqualify it from being a glorious day for the resistance... It makes me wonder...
Has The Resistance become so removed from Lebanon that its glorious days now include a day that saw death, destruction and widespread fear in Lebanon's capital, inflicted directly by the Resistance itself? How can The Resistance, whose promise of never using its arms against its own citizens still forms the basis for its legitimacy, remember as "glorious" a day in which it did just that? Or were the sunni citizens of Beirut and supporter's of Mustaqbal, no longer citizens of Lebanon, the country Hezbollah vowed to protect?
Maybe Nasrallah just joined the ranks of dividers and foreignizers, those who see the "other Lebanon" as another country altogether. Or maybe it was always the case but I was was unable to see it, and it that case, wouldn't that mean that maybe, just maybe, March 14 had actually gotten something right after all?...
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