Why We Don’t Have a Government Yet

It’s been way longer than most people anticipated. Our PM-designate Saadeddine Hariri has, after a couple of months of silent negotiations, just submitted a virtually 'unapprovable' cabinet formation to President Suleiman ('unapprovable' not necessarily because there's something wrong with it, but because it simply won't get approved). The main point of contention is Michel Aoun’s demands (do you begin to see a pattern here) for some key cabinet portfolios as well as some specific names attached to these portfolios. It makes one wonder why, for such a staunch supporter of Consensual Democracy, he's making it so hard to reach consensus.

On the face of it, the whole discussion seems kinda reasonable with both sides having arguably decent positions. Aoun says he wants Jubran Basseel to keep his post of Minister of Telecommunications because he's been doing such a good job. Members of the Hariri camp say they don’t want Jubran Basseel because he failed to keep his parliament seat in the latest round of elections and thus does not have a popular mandate.

Both arguments may have merit. But I don’t see it. The fact that Jubran Basseel “did a good job” does not make him the ONLY person capable of maintaining the ministry, and it certainly doesn't make him the best person for the job. So blocking the formation of the entire cabinet for over 2 months just because he “did a good job” does not make any sense. Give the PM-designate some respect as he exercises his constitutional right to work out the details of the formation. He’s already gone far enough to meet the opposition half way by agreeing to create a cabinet where he doesn’t even have a majority.

However, it’s still a better argument than what the Hariri camp has presented against Basseel. Just as it’s typical of Aoun to block everything, it seems also typical of the Hariri camp to fight back with arbitrary short-lived one-shot principles. “No ‘ministerizing’ losers.” Really? Remember Nassib Lahhoud? Well, two years ago that same camp was proposing that “loser” as one of their two candidates for the Presidency. Sure they never got close to electing him, but they certainly weren’t against it ‘on principle.’ So if no popular mandate is needed to become President, surely no popular mandate is required for a mere Minister of Telecommunications. The whole principle of “not minesterizing losers” loses even more credibility when a good number of Hariri’s proposed cabinet didn’t even run for elections. How did these people earn cabinet positions (including the Finance portfolio) any more than Basseel?

For me it’s obvious that Aoun’s “arguments” and Hariri’s “principles” are there just to hide the real issue. No, I'm not talking about Aoun wanting to satisfy some megalomaniacal desire to see his own will forced upon the PM-designate while the latter having an unfulfilled need to crush Aoun's ego by making him capitulate on his demands. Though, even THAT makes more sense than the actual arguments being presented by both sides.

To understand the real issue, we must ask the question: Why is this particular portfolio so contentious? Why is it so important for Aoun to keep it and for Hariri to take it back?

Well I’m becoming among those who think that, once again, the answer lies in issue of Hezbollah’s weapons (although I’m often reluctant to acknowledge the prevalence of these weapons in many contentious issues of Lebanese politics). Of course we’re not talking about guns and rockets, but about what Nasrallah referred to as Signal Weaponry. Remember the tragic events of May of 2008. These occured when the Lebanese government issued two decisions that caused all hell to break lose including what is now referred to as Hezbollah’s invasion of Beirut. Well the more significant of these two decisions was initiated by then-Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, when he recommended that the government put an end to Hezbollah’s illegal network of wired telecommunication. Hezbollah, which considers this network to be an integral part of its weaponry, saw that as a direct attack on its military infrastructure, and thus carried out Nasrallah’s threat to “cut the hand” that tries to reach for his party’s weapons.

So while to most Lebanese, the Ministry of Telecommunication is basically the place where Internet and mobile phone rates are controlled, it is also the watchtower from which one can keep an eye on Hezbollah’s telecommunications network, and from which, maybe, one day, when Hizbollah is unable to respond as swiftly as in May of 2008, declare this infrastructure illegal once again. Surely Hezbollah doesn't want to see this ministry in the hands of his political rivals for the next four-years while Hariri and his allies certainly don't want to give this powerful card away.

Will We Have Elections Next Year?

So March 14, after a long meeting yesterday, declared a set of principles that will likely govern their policy in the coming days. Among them were many significant statements about the importance of civil peace and coexistence, and about the need to eliminate the different paranoia each community suffers from. But it wouldn't be fun to focus on the stuff I agree with, instead I'd rather focus on those principles I have a problem with, namely:

• "Any solution to the current crisis should lead to eliminating Hezbollah's arms from the internal equation."
• "Resorting to parliamentary elections in order to decide controversial issues is difficult given the possession of weapons by one team and not the other, and in light of the experience of previous elections in which the losing team refused to acknowledge the results by virtue of its arms. "
  (Source (in Arabic): Naharnet)

These principles scare me. Not because they're faulty, but because they're dangerous. I do believe, like any March 14 supporter, that Hezbollah needs to let go of its weapons. I also believe, like any Hezbollah supporter, that now is not the time. I agree with March 14 that we need a strong corruption-free state that has a monopoly on executive, legislative, judiciary and military powers. But I also believe that a strong state is a prerequisite (or at least a co-requisite) of the disarmament of Hezbollah and not the other way around.

The main reason why these principles scare me is that we seem to be headed to a new crisis, one in which parliamentary elections are delayed until an agreement is reached on the status of Hezbollah's weapons. And if our politicians can't agree on the supposedly simple matter of writing the government platform and barring any sudden changes in the regional and international arena, how exactly are they going to settle the matter of Hezbollah's weapons?

There is also a logical flaw in the March 14 principles: Given their assumptions and their stated objectives, their principles lead to a contradiction. In particular:

• Their assumption that Hezbollah could use its weapons in order to prevent election results that are favorable to its opponents.
• Their objective of building a strong independent peaceful and economically viable state.
• Their principle that Hezbollah needs to be disarmed before parliamentary elections.

Here's why these don't fit: according to the assumption, Hezbollah will indeed use its arms to prevent losing in parliamentary elections. But surely that means they will also use their arms to prevent their disarmament (an assumption Nasrallah himself admits - Video 7:46 (in arabic))? And in that case, if March 14's assumption is true and they stick to their principles, then they are leading us straight into one of two options: a devastating civil and regional war aimed at disarming Hezbollah by force or an indefinite halt to our most basic constitutional institution, the parliament. Both of these outcomes seem to contradict March 14's stated objective. QED.