Efficient Warfare

First Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and now Defense Minister Ehud Barak declare that the world needs to redefine the rules of war to allow armies to "deal efficiently with terror coming out of crowded areas and constructed areas." It seems that both Netanyahu and Barak fail to understand that the rules of war have as a sole purpose to protect non-combatants from harm during times of war. They aren't meant to allow armies to "deal efficiently" with anything. And when looking at the context in which these statements are made, one cannot help but think if what is meant by "dealing efficiently with terror" has something to do with what the Goldstone report is accusing Israel of having done: deliberately targeting civilians, bombing a mosque suspected of housing weapons during prayer time, using white phosphorous incendiary bombs in crowded civilian areas, and generally disregarding the weight of loss of civilian life compared to the potential military benefit of an action. In Israeli eyes, it seems, bombing a UN-run school housing 1300 refugees because shots had been fired at the IDF from that location is morally justified, and thus needs to be accommodated for in the new laws of war. How sick and twisted do you need to be to think that if it's illegal to kill 800 civilians out out of 1300 casualties in a 30-day conflict then there's something wrong with the rules?

Maybe I'm overreacting. But there's something about the use of the word "efficient" in the context of war that gives me chills.

The Tawteen Question

In Lebanon, Tawteen, Arabic for "settling," is a word that pops up every now and then in political discourse. It refers to the settling and naturalization of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and it's one of the few concepts that the Lebanese seem to agree upon, in that they are all against it. Normally I like consensus generating issues; they make it seem like we have hope for building a common Lebanese identity. But then when you look at the reasons behind opposing Tawteen, you start to realize there's a disturbing side to this consensus. It seems to me that most Lebanese are opposed to Tawteen for one of three reasons:

1. Tawteen is equivalent to abandoning the Palestinian cause: this reason is cited by most, even though in reality, I think it is far less significant than politicians make it seem.
2. Tawteen disturbs the demographic balance in Lebanon: For Christians who don't genuinely subscribe to the first reason, they fear Tawteen because it tilts the balance further in favor of Muslims, making Christian an even smaller minority. For those Shi'as who don't care about the Palestinian cause, naturalizing a few hundred thousand Sunnis would cause them to lose their slim demographic lead. And finally there are some Sunnis who worry that these Palestinians would be too sympathetic with Hezbollah, and would thus weaken the widespread Sunni support enjoyed by Hezbollah's opponents.
3. Tawteen disturbs Lebanese identity. In other words, Palestinians aren't Lebanese and naturalizing them would weaken Lebanese identity.

The first reason is one that I find particularly strange. Abandoning or not the Palestinian cause should be solely a Palestinian question, not one to be discussed in Lebanese parliament halls. After all, the Palestinian cause is not an end in itself, but rather a means to a bigger end which is the well-being of the Palestinian people. Those who support the Palestinian cause at the expense of the lives and livelihoods of Palestinians seem to be confusing the cause as a struggle against Israel, rather than a struggle for Palestine. If we as a nation want to support the Palestinian cause, we must do so by aiding them in their struggle, not by forcing them to remain in it. In that context, the question of Tawteen is a Palestinian question, not a Lebanese one.

The two other reasons can be summarized by two words: sectarianism and xenophobia, and as a secular liberal I reject them utterly and completely. The Palestinians are not here by choice. They're not here to abuse our weak economy or usurp our fragile democracy. They are no more different from the Lebanese than we are from each other ethnically, politically, and culturally. And given the sheer number of Lebanese holding dual-citizenship, living abroad in hope of a better life - out of choice mind you - it makes me wonder where we get off forbidding the Palestinians in Lebanon a chance at a better life for themselves in our small country.

So putting aside our xenophobia and our sectarianism, the question of Tawteen is very easy to answer. Ask the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to decide their own fate. If they decide they are tired of struggling, then let's find a way to help them achieve their aspirations and reach a better life. And if they refuse to live anywhere outside their homeland, then so be it.

Results Are In

There's something strangely calming about the democratic process even when you're not completely satisfied with the results. And as political pundits all around the world were discussing the scope and effect of a Hezbollah win, the Lebanese were busy voting for the March 14 coalition. This means that, as bad as the last four years were in terms of security and economy, the Lebanese seem to think it's still better than the alternative. What the alternative is, no one really knows, and no one will know for the time being. Some think it's an Islamic republic where women are forced to wear chadors, others think it's a utopia of progress, transparency, strength and stability. Both are probably wrong, and I think the alternative is much closer to the current reality than our politicians on both sides would want us to think.

But let's not dwell on what could have been, and focus on what is and what will be. So March 14 won the election again with somewhere around 70 seats in the 128 seat parliament. That's a healthy majority (more than the slim majority the Hezbollah camp were expected to win, and similar to the one March 14 won four years ago), but it doesn't change much in the composition of the previous parliament. So I don't see much change coming to Lebanon. The petty political haggling over cabinet seats will continue, the parliament will not regain it's full constitutional role and will still be chaperoned by the national dialogue table.

To be honest, I'm not too worried about the future. With Obama at the helm of the West, the 14 Marchers will not be encouraged or pressured into an aggressive stance against Hezbollah as they were under the Bush administration. And hopefully, if Ahmedinejad loses elections on Friday, Iran's stance would be moderated as well, and that will certainly have a positive influence of Lebanese political stability.

Add to that the benefit of taking away Israel's excuse of treating Lebanon as a "terrorist state" under a Hezbollah-led government, I'd say all in all the election result has a pretty thick silver lining...

My only regret is that my curiousity has not been satisfied. It's easy supporting the opposition when you've never seen them in power, and I was looking forward to see how both sides would act in a new balance of paliamentary power. Would March 14 have made a more responsible opposition? And would Hezbollah and Aoun have remained as keen on national unity and dialogue and fighting corruption as they were the past three years? Well I guess we won't find out before at least another 4 years.

Until then, we have a couple of weeks of intense political bickering to look forward to as the next government is formed... Keeping in mind that the government that comes out of the new parliament gets a complete four-year term, I wouldn't bet on a tension-free process considering also how hard it was to agree on the previous government even when it only had a nine-month mandate.

One last thought... The March 14 and Hezbollah-FPM alliances aren't immune to the changes in the international and regional political climates, and some changes in the makeup of these blocs should not be ruled out.

The March 14 Prophecy

There's a funny story we used to tell about March 14 supporters who, in the days leading to March 14, seemed to have forgotten that they weren't alone in the country. So much so, that on March 8, one soon-to-be March 14er told a reporter, "I don't know why they did that, we were all united before they showed up."

This "March 14 equals Lebanon" formula was not just a passing theme. It had become a fundamental part of internal and regional Lebanese politics over the next four years, referring to the year-long opposition sit-in in downtown Beirut as an "occupation," continually using the mantra "state within a state," and culminating in July 2006 when Fouad Sanioura accepted then US Secretary of State Condalezza Rice's full support for Lebanon at the same time that her administration and congress was handing Israel extra fuel and munitions to bomb the non-March-14-friendly South of Lebanon. Today, this 'foreignization' of the opposition can be seen in March 14's electoral campaign: "Vote for Lebanon." It's leaders' political speech includes such brilliant statements as "If March 8 wins, then Lebanon will be ruled from Damascus's countryside."

This mentality, which had become so prevalent in March 14 speech that I have come to believe it runs far deeper than mere tactical political smearing, is my primary issue with March 14. The fundamentally hypocritical monopolization of Lebanese identity by a group of parties that represent half of Lebanon and whose founding principles were those of unity and coexistence stood in stark contrast with everything I believe in as a Lebanese. This pushed me so far away from this political group that I felt a sense of belonging among the citizens of "Non-Lebanese" Lebanon.

Enter Hassan Nasrallah.

Since May 7, 2008, I had been rationalizing how the events of that day were a tragic yet inevitable result of an extreme political climate coupled with an irresponsible government decision. I had convinced myself that Hezbollah was cornered and had little other choice. Of course though some details of the events are unforgivable (such as the burning down of Future TV headquarters), the event itself seemed like a heavy price paid by Lebanon for an overdue wake-up call. I believed, and still do, that Lebanon needed to simply pick up the pieces and move forward.

And that it did. The coming months saw the best political climate Lebanon has seen since before February 14th 2005. The Doha accords, the election of a president, the new government and the new electoral law all gave me a little hope. Yet I never went as far as saying that all this was a direct result of May 7, not because I didn't believe so, but probably because I refused to attribute these positive developments to such a negative event.

Yesterday, during a graduation ceremony in Beirut's southern suburb, Nasrallah said, "I tell the Lebanese, in particular Sunnis and Shiites, that the May 7 events put an end to war in Beirut. The May 7 events safeguarded Lebanon's institutions and forced all Lebanese parties to go back to the dialogue, which led to the election of President Michel Sleiman."

So, unlike me, Nasrallah does not seem to have that problem in admitting that these events are directly responsible for the seemingly positive events that followed. And though I had often hoped Nasrallah would apologize to those he had wronged on that day in order to heal the wound upon which recent stability was built, I half-heartedly understood his inability to do so (I say inability because I also managed to convince myself that he actually wanted to apologize but couldn't). So imagine how I felt when he went and declared yesterday, "that May 7 was a glorious day in the history of the resistance."

A glorious day? Really??

May 25 is a glorious day for Lebanon. I also accepted, despite the death and destruction, that August 14 was as a glorious day... May 7, 2008 was certainly NOT a glorious day for Lebanon and if Mr. Nasrallah thinks that doesn't disqualify it from being a glorious day for the resistance... It makes me wonder...

Has The Resistance become so removed from Lebanon that its glorious days now include a day that saw death, destruction and widespread fear in Lebanon's capital, inflicted directly by the Resistance itself? How can The Resistance, whose promise of never using its arms against its own citizens still forms the basis for its legitimacy, remember as "glorious" a day in which it did just that? Or were the sunni citizens of Beirut and supporter's of Mustaqbal, no longer citizens of Lebanon, the country Hezbollah vowed to protect?

Maybe Nasrallah just joined the ranks of dividers and foreignizers, those who see the "other Lebanon" as another country altogether. Or maybe it was always the case but I was was unable to see it, and it that case, wouldn't that mean that maybe, just maybe, March 14 had actually gotten something right after all?...

Not all Women Are Equal?

A while ago, I mentioned a popular campaign for granting Lebanese women who are married to foreigners equal rights in terms of citizenship for their children. Current citizenship law states that any person born of a Lebanese father is entitled to citizenship.

A parliamentary committee has been set up to propose a change to the law. Now you might think, "why on earth do they need a committee to add two words to a law?" After all, all we need to fix this is add the words "or mother" to that law and all will be well.

Turns out, someone in the committee proposed adding an exception: Lebanese women married to Palestinian men. Their rationale is that allowing these women to give Lebanese citizenship to their children is essentially a form of "Tawteen" (Arabic for "nationalization" which has become a Lebanese political taboo word meaning granting citizenship to Palestinian refugees).

The weird thing is that opponents of this essentially racist exception aren't so much concerned with arguing that this exception is inherently wrong and unjust, but rather they are arguing that it isn't really necessary "protect" the Lebanese from Tawteen. So the committee, and this is the funny part, decided to conduct a survey to see how many Palestinian children might benefit from this law. You know... to see if there is a real risk of Tawteen.

It seems the committee has totally forgotten the reason they're doing what they're doing. The whole point of the amendment was to bring about equality in rights between Lebanese men and women. And although injustice against the Palestinians themselves in terms of their civil rights is far from uncommon in Lebanon, extending the inequality to include Lebanese nationals married to Palestinians is new. And quite scary. We're not even talking about equality between men and women anymore... We're talking about equality between Lebanese women, based on who they're married to.

It seems that for some people, avoiding Tawteen is more important than justice and equality. The fact that this is even a legitimate debate is shameful.

Info and photo from: Al-Akhbar (arabic).

Black man in the White House

Well this blog is supposed to all about Lebanese politics, but let’s face it, who wants to hear about Hariri or Nasrallah today… Today and probably the next couple of weeks will be all about the new guy in the White House, even more so (if that is at all possible) than the previous weeks have been about who the new guy will be.

But this blog is also about my perspective on important issues, and in the spirit of this blog, I want to go all out and describe how I feel today to see, four to eight years from now, how right or wrong I was.

Experience has told me not to get excited when a new president is elected in the US. Many Lebanese and Arabs insist that all American presidents are the same; they only differ in how they choose to screw us. I remember eight years ago when we were hoping for a Bush victory against Gore, in fear that Gore will continue the pro-Israel policy of the Clinton administration. Until we realized, a few years later, that there is worse than a pro-Israel White House, and that’s an anti-Arab White House.

So experience tells me that I’m going out on a limb here when I say this: I am not only relieved Obama won in the sense that I’m glad it’s not McCain, I am actually genuinely happy, optimistic and downright cheerful. Some may think this is naïve, but I’m afraid I’ve been swept away by Obamania…

I had a hard time sleeping last night, waking up at 4 a.m. unable to bring myself to sleep until I turned on the TV, only for a minute, to see preliminary results showing Obama leading with around 200 electoral votes, McCain trailing behind with 90. I woke up in the morning and watched Obama’s 17 minute victory speech. I think this is the first time in my life I’ve ever gotten goose bumps listening to an American president speak.

How refreshing it was for me to hear from a US president (or president-elect in this case) a speech that spoke directly to the non-Americans offering a message of hope, and not in a do-what-I-tell-you-and-everything-will-be-fine kind of way.

“To all those watching tonight from beyond our shores, from parliaments and palaces to those who are huddled around radios in the forgotten corners of our world - our stories are singular, but our destiny is shared, and a new dawn of American leadership is at hand.”

My message to the new Obama leadership is this:

I often hear of a time when America was a nation admired rather than feared, when American democracy was a source of inspiration rather than concern, when American values were sought rather than imposed. But I’m too young to remember any such time… I only hope I am young enough to see it happen again.

Suffrage at Last!

OK, granted I haven't been living outside Lebanon for a very long time, it's still long enough for me to have never voted in parliamentary elections. So obviously I got very excited to hear that the parliamentary committee charged with drafting reforms for the current electoral law has decided to allow non-resident nationals to vote at Lebanese embassies of their respective residence (Naharnet). With more Lebanese living abroad than inside Lebanon, this decision is long overdue.

All we have to do now is wait for parliament to ratify the new reforms, among which there is also talk of reducing the legal age for voting from 21 to 18. Another welcome change as far as I'm concerned.

All Men Are Equal

The Nationality Campaign is a popular campaign for granting Lebanese women the same legal rights as Lebanese men especially in terms of their right to give their children and husband the Lebanese nationality.
I feel ridiculous saying I support this demand, but since there are people out there still making it, then it's likely that not enough people are supporting it.

Photo by OTV taken from tayyar.org.

Will We Have Elections Next Year?

So March 14, after a long meeting yesterday, declared a set of principles that will likely govern their policy in the coming days. Among them were many significant statements about the importance of civil peace and coexistence, and about the need to eliminate the different paranoia each community suffers from. But it wouldn't be fun to focus on the stuff I agree with, instead I'd rather focus on those principles I have a problem with, namely:

• "Any solution to the current crisis should lead to eliminating Hezbollah's arms from the internal equation."
• "Resorting to parliamentary elections in order to decide controversial issues is difficult given the possession of weapons by one team and not the other, and in light of the experience of previous elections in which the losing team refused to acknowledge the results by virtue of its arms. "
  (Source (in Arabic): Naharnet)

These principles scare me. Not because they're faulty, but because they're dangerous. I do believe, like any March 14 supporter, that Hezbollah needs to let go of its weapons. I also believe, like any Hezbollah supporter, that now is not the time. I agree with March 14 that we need a strong corruption-free state that has a monopoly on executive, legislative, judiciary and military powers. But I also believe that a strong state is a prerequisite (or at least a co-requisite) of the disarmament of Hezbollah and not the other way around.

The main reason why these principles scare me is that we seem to be headed to a new crisis, one in which parliamentary elections are delayed until an agreement is reached on the status of Hezbollah's weapons. And if our politicians can't agree on the supposedly simple matter of writing the government platform and barring any sudden changes in the regional and international arena, how exactly are they going to settle the matter of Hezbollah's weapons?

There is also a logical flaw in the March 14 principles: Given their assumptions and their stated objectives, their principles lead to a contradiction. In particular:

• Their assumption that Hezbollah could use its weapons in order to prevent election results that are favorable to its opponents.
• Their objective of building a strong independent peaceful and economically viable state.
• Their principle that Hezbollah needs to be disarmed before parliamentary elections.

Here's why these don't fit: according to the assumption, Hezbollah will indeed use its arms to prevent losing in parliamentary elections. But surely that means they will also use their arms to prevent their disarmament (an assumption Nasrallah himself admits - Video 7:46 (in arabic))? And in that case, if March 14's assumption is true and they stick to their principles, then they are leading us straight into one of two options: a devastating civil and regional war aimed at disarming Hezbollah by force or an indefinite halt to our most basic constitutional institution, the parliament. Both of these outcomes seem to contradict March 14's stated objective. QED.

The Two Coffins

I can’t tell you how disappointed I was this morning when I found out the two Israeli soldiers are dead. Actually, I can… I was really really disappointed. And although every possible rationalization led to the conclusion that they are dead, I was still hoping (not nearly as much as their families) that they are alive. I am also somewhat ashamed that on the Lebanese side, we have people who have actually killed two soldiers, stole their bodies, and kept their families in the dark. Whichever way you look at it, this kind of action is not nearly as admirable as the cause for which its perpetrators claim they support.
Finally, I am angry… at the thought that the July 2006 war was fought over the bodies of two dead soldiers. That Israel waged a 34-day catastrophic war in which around 1400 people died, in an attempt to rescue two dead soldiers. It makes you wonder if this whole thing could have been avoided had the Israelis known that the soldiers were already dead. I know it’s simplistic, but it still does make you wonder…
Photo from Getty Images.

National Unity

So I go on holidays for 3 days and suddenly we have a new government… But I’m not complaining.
The new government is something we’ve all wanted for some time. Some have waited 6 weeks for it (since the resignation of the previous cabinet), some have waited 20 months (since the opposition demanded the resignation of the previous cabinet), and some have basically been waiting since July 2005 when the previous cabinet took office). But the point is we’re all happy about the fact that the new government is here, so that’s something we agree on.
What we don’t agree on is how much we’re happy and for what reasons. My guess is that most Lebanese, myself included, are just glad there is a new government in place that they hope will be able to look after their needs. But some Lebanese, myself included, have some particular opinions about what they like and what they don’t like about the new cabinet. And in the spirit of this blog, I will make explicit some of my opinions to see if they will come back to bite me in the ass in 2 years time:
What I like:

1. All major (and some minor) parties are represented in the new cabinet. Say what you will about democracy and how in other countries the majority rules. I still think it’s a good thing.
2. Majority still rules: with 16 out of 30 ministers, the March 14 camp still has the final say on day-to-day decisions that affect people’s lives, but with major decisions that affect the identity of our nation require consensus.
3. Hezbollah has only one minister. This undermines the claim that they are trying to control everything in the country.
4. The redistribution of certain portfolios (like Telecommunications), undermines the claim by the opposition that the March 14 politicians cling to power like a dog to a bone.
5. The Interior and Defense portfolios were named by the President who is still seen as a neutral well-respected and patriotic figure.
6. Lot of new names and fresh faces.

What I don’t like:

1. Some portfolios were retained by people who did not do a particularly fine job with them in the past: Defense by Murr and Foreign by Salloukh.
2. The way the seats are distributed on sectarian lines is somewhat disturbing. I know this is expected, but it doesn’t make it any less ugly.
3. Ali Kanso. Partly because I don't particularly like him, but mainly because so many hate him.
4. The fact that the cabinet still needs to propose a platform and gain parliamentary confidence before it assumes its powers… and God only knows how long this would take.

Photo licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License.

Musical Cabinet Chairs

The only thing worse than when one party acts as judge, jury and executioner is when ALL parties act as judge, jury and executioner, and this seems to be what's going on in Lebanon. Prime Minister designate Fouad Sanioura is trying to come up with a cabinet that satisfies everybody, and no one's making it any easier for him. Both sides just keep making up rules as they go along based on nothing but their own agenda.

- Michel Aoun, for some reason, claims he has the right to a "sovereign" portfolio, and spent five weeks arguing about that until he was offered the Vice-Premiership.
- Geagea, whose parliamentary block about four times smaller than that of Aoun, seems to think he has as much rights as Aoun to the point of actually saying, "If Aoun gets a sovereign portfolio, I want one too!"
- Sleiman Franjieh seems to think that the PM designate has no right to reject any of the names suggested by the opposition, including Ali Kanso who is hated by pretty much all of Sanioura's constituancy.
- Then there's Sanioura himself who doesn't seem to care much about his current constitutional role as (a) a resigned Prime Minister with no executive powers "except in the narrow sense of managing affairs", and (b) a Prime Minister designate with no executive powers until his new cabinet gets a parliamentary confidence. So he goes around making Prime Ministerly decisions and statements in between his talks with rival politicians.
- Finally there's Emile Lahoud who, in his capacity as Former President, seems to think, along with many others, that he has the right to set deadlines for the new cabinet formation.

The way I see it, the rules are quite simple. The constitution states that the PM, along with the President, forms the cabinet, and the Parliament gives it confidence. The Doha accord added the constraint that opposition gets 11 seats in the cabinet. So as far as I'm concerned, if you put these two together, the opposition should just play nice and agree to any 11 seats. But of course, the problem now isn't that the opposition doesn’t accept the portfolios given to them, but that they seem to have taken so many, that the March 14 majority can't figure out how to share the rest. Seems that no matter how you flip it, there's always one seat missing... Kind of like a really messed up game of Musical Chairs.

But finally, what I really don't get is: Why is this such a big deal? The elections are in ten to eleven months anyway and if the President gets the Interior Ministry (which oversees the elections), does anyone really care who gets telecommunications or infrastructure? Do all Lebanese politicians think they're so important that the country would collapse if the Economy, Finance or the Labor portfolios were run by someone else for a year?