Efficient Warfare

First Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and now Defense Minister Ehud Barak declare that the world needs to redefine the rules of war to allow armies to "deal efficiently with terror coming out of crowded areas and constructed areas." It seems that both Netanyahu and Barak fail to understand that the rules of war have as a sole purpose to protect non-combatants from harm during times of war. They aren't meant to allow armies to "deal efficiently" with anything. And when looking at the context in which these statements are made, one cannot help but think if what is meant by "dealing efficiently with terror" has something to do with what the Goldstone report is accusing Israel of having done: deliberately targeting civilians, bombing a mosque suspected of housing weapons during prayer time, using white phosphorous incendiary bombs in crowded civilian areas, and generally disregarding the weight of loss of civilian life compared to the potential military benefit of an action. In Israeli eyes, it seems, bombing a UN-run school housing 1300 refugees because shots had been fired at the IDF from that location is morally justified, and thus needs to be accommodated for in the new laws of war. How sick and twisted do you need to be to think that if it's illegal to kill 800 civilians out out of 1300 casualties in a 30-day conflict then there's something wrong with the rules?

Maybe I'm overreacting. But there's something about the use of the word "efficient" in the context of war that gives me chills.

The Blame Game

I once read about an interesting distinction made by American sociologist Harvey Sacks between two types of consequences for actions. Class 1 consequences are effects that naturally result from an action, for example, if you put your hand in the fire, you will get burned. Class 2 consequences are those that require the action of another human being, for example, if you murder someone, then you go to jail. You don't automatically get teleported to jail as soon as you pull the trigger. Someone has to put you there. This is very different from Class 1 consequences which are a direct result of your action. Human adults can tell the difference between the two, but children can't. That's why, when they're young enough, children don't bear grudges against their parents when they are punished, because to them the punishment is a Class 1 consequence of their actions, i.e. it could not have been avoided. The parent didn't CHOOSE to punish the child. A child then wouldn't hate his parent for spanking them in much the same way that an adult wouldn't hate a candle for burning him.

So what does all that have to do with anything? Well, it seems to me that it isn't only children that don't understand this distinction. A few days ago, Israeli president Shimon Peres made a statement about the threat Hezbollah poses to Lebanon. During a speech he said, "It's not Israel that is endangering Lebanon, but rather Hezbollah, just as Hamas is endangering the Palestinians." This is not the first time this type of talking point is used by an Israeli politician. Several times in the past the Israelis have attempted to get the Lebanese to turn against Hezbollah by convincing them that latter's actions lead to the destruction of Lebanon, as though they, the Israelis, have nothing to do with it. Now I don't know if Mr. Peres actually believes this to be true, or if he just says it hoping people are naive enough to accept it. To him, when Israel deals out death and destruction to its enemies, it is merely a direct consequence of Hezbollah (or Hamas) action. But we are not children, and while we may understand that Hezbollah's actions are what instigated a war to start with, we are old enough to realize that the individual atrocities committed by the IDF are not natural and unavoidable consequences of Hezbollah's behavior, but are rather Israeli actions implementing Israeli decisions.

So the whole "the Lebanese should understand that Hezbollah is their enemy, not Israel" paradigm doesn't work on rational adults. Sure it might make us dislike Hezbollah, but it makes us deeply despise Israel far more. After all, if some guy walks up to you and shoots you in the leg, you might blame the guy who provoked him, and you might even get pissed off at the guy who made the gun, but the person you're gonna hate the most and seek revenge against is the one who pulled the trigger.

The Tawteen Question

In Lebanon, Tawteen, Arabic for "settling," is a word that pops up every now and then in political discourse. It refers to the settling and naturalization of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and it's one of the few concepts that the Lebanese seem to agree upon, in that they are all against it. Normally I like consensus generating issues; they make it seem like we have hope for building a common Lebanese identity. But then when you look at the reasons behind opposing Tawteen, you start to realize there's a disturbing side to this consensus. It seems to me that most Lebanese are opposed to Tawteen for one of three reasons:

1. Tawteen is equivalent to abandoning the Palestinian cause: this reason is cited by most, even though in reality, I think it is far less significant than politicians make it seem.
2. Tawteen disturbs the demographic balance in Lebanon: For Christians who don't genuinely subscribe to the first reason, they fear Tawteen because it tilts the balance further in favor of Muslims, making Christian an even smaller minority. For those Shi'as who don't care about the Palestinian cause, naturalizing a few hundred thousand Sunnis would cause them to lose their slim demographic lead. And finally there are some Sunnis who worry that these Palestinians would be too sympathetic with Hezbollah, and would thus weaken the widespread Sunni support enjoyed by Hezbollah's opponents.
3. Tawteen disturbs Lebanese identity. In other words, Palestinians aren't Lebanese and naturalizing them would weaken Lebanese identity.

The first reason is one that I find particularly strange. Abandoning or not the Palestinian cause should be solely a Palestinian question, not one to be discussed in Lebanese parliament halls. After all, the Palestinian cause is not an end in itself, but rather a means to a bigger end which is the well-being of the Palestinian people. Those who support the Palestinian cause at the expense of the lives and livelihoods of Palestinians seem to be confusing the cause as a struggle against Israel, rather than a struggle for Palestine. If we as a nation want to support the Palestinian cause, we must do so by aiding them in their struggle, not by forcing them to remain in it. In that context, the question of Tawteen is a Palestinian question, not a Lebanese one.

The two other reasons can be summarized by two words: sectarianism and xenophobia, and as a secular liberal I reject them utterly and completely. The Palestinians are not here by choice. They're not here to abuse our weak economy or usurp our fragile democracy. They are no more different from the Lebanese than we are from each other ethnically, politically, and culturally. And given the sheer number of Lebanese holding dual-citizenship, living abroad in hope of a better life - out of choice mind you - it makes me wonder where we get off forbidding the Palestinians in Lebanon a chance at a better life for themselves in our small country.

So putting aside our xenophobia and our sectarianism, the question of Tawteen is very easy to answer. Ask the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to decide their own fate. If they decide they are tired of struggling, then let's find a way to help them achieve their aspirations and reach a better life. And if they refuse to live anywhere outside their homeland, then so be it.

The Majority Delusion

There are many reasons to criticize Aoun's inflexibility on the issue of the cabinet formation, some more meaningful than others. Some say he's putting his ego and his personal or family interests ahead of the interest of his community and his country. Some are a bit more forgiving and say it's his political party not his personal interests that is being treated to a free ride at the expense of the nation. It's not easy, if one wishes it, to argue against these claims (or for them for that matter) as they are derived from complex political analysis and reasoning and more often than not fueled by subjective and nonrational opinions. The validity of these claims thus ends up in the intractable realm of the unprovable and the unfalsifiable.

There are, however, those who criticize Aoun's stubbornness by claiming he doesn't have the right to make the demands he's making, that since he lost the elections, the constitution requires him to just sit back and let the winners make the government as they please, and that with Hariri having already made enough compromise by giving in to the 15-10-5 formula (15 pro-majority ministers, 10 pro-opposition, and 5 neutral selected by the president), the opposition no longer has the right to pin up these demands. They even go to the extent of believing, with some degree of delusion might I add, that the only reason Hariri is even humoring Aoun's demands, rather than just making up his own government, is out of fear of military repercussions from Hezbollah's mighty militia, akin to what happened in May of 2008. This argument, being based on the legality of the demands rather than their morality, is quite easy to validate. In fact, the facts on the ground point undeniably to one conclusion: ugly though these demands may be to some, they are perfectly legal and have absolutely no need for either extortion with military threats or enforcement by foreign backing.

I do like to say here, that I'm not a big fan of the way the issue is being handled by the opposition, and I certainly am not saying Aoun should be doing things the way he is. I'm simply here to make the case that he has the right to, whether we like it or not.

Simply put, Hariri does not have the constitutional authority to ignore Aoun's demands, and this is precisely why he chose to resign rather than ignore them. Ignoring them was simply not a legal option, and it still isn't. It's true that Hariri's camp won the elections, but we all know what happened after that. Jumblatt, along with his ten MPs broke off from the March 14 group, and although they didn't join the ranks of the opposition, they certainly can no longer be counted among Hariri's coalition. This means that Hariri now controls 60 of the 128 seats in parliament, which leaves 68 MPs outside of his control. For any government proposed by Hariri to get parliamentary confidence, some of these non-Hariri MPs have to vote for it. Now given that Jumblatt is adamant about the 15-10-5 formula, and obviously the 57 opposition MPs won't have anything to do with a government that doesn't adhere to it, how exactly can one perceive Hariri's adoption of this formula as some sort of compromise on his part? And we haven't even mentioned the role of the President, whose signature on the cabinet formation is needed to make it valid, and who on more than one occasion said he won't agree to a cabinet that does not get approval of the opposition.

So in short, Hariri's agreement to form a national unity government does not stem solely from his desire to be collegial and conciliatory. It also stems from the fact that he simply doesn't have enough friends in parliament or in the presidential palace to legally do anything else. This makes the 15-10-5 requirement a matter of fact rather than compromise. And although Hariri "won" the elections, Aoun's demands now have the implicit backing of the president as well as the majority of parliament, which makes them as legal as they can possibly get short of being a matter of national consensus.

So unless Hariri is willing to step aside and let someone else take over, he has to figure out a way to strike a deal with Aoun and his allies about their demands. And in that case, he should accept that the 15-10-5 formula is the starting point of negotiations and not the middle ground he has been claiming it is. Aoun's demands need to be dealt with seriously and not be dismissed as the ravings of an egotistical mad man... But, yeah, that doesn't mean he's not an asshole.

Why We Don’t Have a Government Yet

It’s been way longer than most people anticipated. Our PM-designate Saadeddine Hariri has, after a couple of months of silent negotiations, just submitted a virtually 'unapprovable' cabinet formation to President Suleiman ('unapprovable' not necessarily because there's something wrong with it, but because it simply won't get approved). The main point of contention is Michel Aoun’s demands (do you begin to see a pattern here) for some key cabinet portfolios as well as some specific names attached to these portfolios. It makes one wonder why, for such a staunch supporter of Consensual Democracy, he's making it so hard to reach consensus.

On the face of it, the whole discussion seems kinda reasonable with both sides having arguably decent positions. Aoun says he wants Jubran Basseel to keep his post of Minister of Telecommunications because he's been doing such a good job. Members of the Hariri camp say they don’t want Jubran Basseel because he failed to keep his parliament seat in the latest round of elections and thus does not have a popular mandate.

Both arguments may have merit. But I don’t see it. The fact that Jubran Basseel “did a good job” does not make him the ONLY person capable of maintaining the ministry, and it certainly doesn't make him the best person for the job. So blocking the formation of the entire cabinet for over 2 months just because he “did a good job” does not make any sense. Give the PM-designate some respect as he exercises his constitutional right to work out the details of the formation. He’s already gone far enough to meet the opposition half way by agreeing to create a cabinet where he doesn’t even have a majority.

However, it’s still a better argument than what the Hariri camp has presented against Basseel. Just as it’s typical of Aoun to block everything, it seems also typical of the Hariri camp to fight back with arbitrary short-lived one-shot principles. “No ‘ministerizing’ losers.” Really? Remember Nassib Lahhoud? Well, two years ago that same camp was proposing that “loser” as one of their two candidates for the Presidency. Sure they never got close to electing him, but they certainly weren’t against it ‘on principle.’ So if no popular mandate is needed to become President, surely no popular mandate is required for a mere Minister of Telecommunications. The whole principle of “not minesterizing losers” loses even more credibility when a good number of Hariri’s proposed cabinet didn’t even run for elections. How did these people earn cabinet positions (including the Finance portfolio) any more than Basseel?

For me it’s obvious that Aoun’s “arguments” and Hariri’s “principles” are there just to hide the real issue. No, I'm not talking about Aoun wanting to satisfy some megalomaniacal desire to see his own will forced upon the PM-designate while the latter having an unfulfilled need to crush Aoun's ego by making him capitulate on his demands. Though, even THAT makes more sense than the actual arguments being presented by both sides.

To understand the real issue, we must ask the question: Why is this particular portfolio so contentious? Why is it so important for Aoun to keep it and for Hariri to take it back?

Well I’m becoming among those who think that, once again, the answer lies in issue of Hezbollah’s weapons (although I’m often reluctant to acknowledge the prevalence of these weapons in many contentious issues of Lebanese politics). Of course we’re not talking about guns and rockets, but about what Nasrallah referred to as Signal Weaponry. Remember the tragic events of May of 2008. These occured when the Lebanese government issued two decisions that caused all hell to break lose including what is now referred to as Hezbollah’s invasion of Beirut. Well the more significant of these two decisions was initiated by then-Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, when he recommended that the government put an end to Hezbollah’s illegal network of wired telecommunication. Hezbollah, which considers this network to be an integral part of its weaponry, saw that as a direct attack on its military infrastructure, and thus carried out Nasrallah’s threat to “cut the hand” that tries to reach for his party’s weapons.

So while to most Lebanese, the Ministry of Telecommunication is basically the place where Internet and mobile phone rates are controlled, it is also the watchtower from which one can keep an eye on Hezbollah’s telecommunications network, and from which, maybe, one day, when Hizbollah is unable to respond as swiftly as in May of 2008, declare this infrastructure illegal once again. Surely Hezbollah doesn't want to see this ministry in the hands of his political rivals for the next four-years while Hariri and his allies certainly don't want to give this powerful card away.

Three Reasons for Calm

I've been silent for a while again, but in my defense, so has Hariri. Since the elections, positive signs began to appear here and there, with the M8/M14 divide beginning to seem weaker. Meetings between rivals, most notably Hariri and Nasrallah, were a-plenty and things seemed to be heading towards a tension-free transition.

Berri's reelection as parliament speaker defied all political logic (given his past role in paralyzing in the parliament for the better part of 2007-2008) and proved that Lebanon's hope for a better future has overcome its fear of a bitter past. It was also a very visible reminder that Lebanon does not function like other democracies where the majority gets to pick, regardless of what the minority wants.

But the political lovemaking seems to be over and an eerie silence has taken hold. Of course, there's a few statements here and there with specific demands and claims by individual parties, but the general atmosphere is nothing compared to what took place after the Doha agreement, where Sanioura had the seemingly impossible task of distributing 10 portfolios to 15 eager ministery hopefuls. Hariri himself has been awefully quiet and I thank him for that. Hezbollah has been less quiet, but when they have spoken, steered clear of tension-generating words such as "the disruptive third" or even the more positive "insuring third." Instead they refer to "a new formula" that ensures "effective participation", which, to be honest, seems to say pretty much the same thing.

This quiet does not, to me, indicate that things are going well. Sure they're not going horribly wrong, but I suspect several not so encouraging reasons behind this:

1. A slightly positive explanation is this: Parties involved are aware that eventually a government has to be formed and the higher they raise the stakes, the more difficult it will be for a "no-winner no-loser" agreement to be reached. And we all know too well, from May of last year, what a "winner-loser" formula costs. So unlike last year, when both parties cut off any route for retreat for themselves, the positions now are a lot softer. Hariri is not declaring every other day that he is against giving the opposition a third of government seats, and Nasrallah is not declaring everyday that he will accept nothing less. Aoun and some of the lesser M14 players are a different story, but even they seem to be quieting down a bit.

2. A less positive but similar alternative explanation: The final outcome of the discussions are dependant on a lot of external factors, namely Syria's new found love with the international and Arab communities. The Lebanese players themselves are remaining somewhat silent because they aren't as much in control of the situation as they would like to be. They certainly want to avoid making grandiose statements about what they accept and do not accept as government makeup only to find out that an agreement made in the halls of international diplomacy says otherwise.

3. Finally, the least optimistic alternative: The actual division is still as deep as it used to be. Hezbollah's weapons are still the fudamental problem with Hariri wanting to form a government strong enough to get rid of these weapons once and for all and Nasrallah wanting, well, none of that. The only reason they aren't yelling and screaming at each other is that summer is here. A temporary truce has been called, because despite of all their differences, all parties agree on how badly Lebanon's economy needs a successful touristic season. Tourism this summer in Lebanon is expected to reach a historic record high of up to 2 million tourists (in a country that houses 4 million remember). So all real discussion is postponed until something like September when the tourists go home and the loud political bickering resumes.

Results Are In

There's something strangely calming about the democratic process even when you're not completely satisfied with the results. And as political pundits all around the world were discussing the scope and effect of a Hezbollah win, the Lebanese were busy voting for the March 14 coalition. This means that, as bad as the last four years were in terms of security and economy, the Lebanese seem to think it's still better than the alternative. What the alternative is, no one really knows, and no one will know for the time being. Some think it's an Islamic republic where women are forced to wear chadors, others think it's a utopia of progress, transparency, strength and stability. Both are probably wrong, and I think the alternative is much closer to the current reality than our politicians on both sides would want us to think.

But let's not dwell on what could have been, and focus on what is and what will be. So March 14 won the election again with somewhere around 70 seats in the 128 seat parliament. That's a healthy majority (more than the slim majority the Hezbollah camp were expected to win, and similar to the one March 14 won four years ago), but it doesn't change much in the composition of the previous parliament. So I don't see much change coming to Lebanon. The petty political haggling over cabinet seats will continue, the parliament will not regain it's full constitutional role and will still be chaperoned by the national dialogue table.

To be honest, I'm not too worried about the future. With Obama at the helm of the West, the 14 Marchers will not be encouraged or pressured into an aggressive stance against Hezbollah as they were under the Bush administration. And hopefully, if Ahmedinejad loses elections on Friday, Iran's stance would be moderated as well, and that will certainly have a positive influence of Lebanese political stability.

Add to that the benefit of taking away Israel's excuse of treating Lebanon as a "terrorist state" under a Hezbollah-led government, I'd say all in all the election result has a pretty thick silver lining...

My only regret is that my curiousity has not been satisfied. It's easy supporting the opposition when you've never seen them in power, and I was looking forward to see how both sides would act in a new balance of paliamentary power. Would March 14 have made a more responsible opposition? And would Hezbollah and Aoun have remained as keen on national unity and dialogue and fighting corruption as they were the past three years? Well I guess we won't find out before at least another 4 years.

Until then, we have a couple of weeks of intense political bickering to look forward to as the next government is formed... Keeping in mind that the government that comes out of the new parliament gets a complete four-year term, I wouldn't bet on a tension-free process considering also how hard it was to agree on the previous government even when it only had a nine-month mandate.

One last thought... The March 14 and Hezbollah-FPM alliances aren't immune to the changes in the international and regional political climates, and some changes in the makeup of these blocs should not be ruled out.